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UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY  
IN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY: 






Croatia is a small, Middle European country which was only recently 
able to reinstate itself as a sovereign state. Having been a part of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire up to the First World War and within the 
Yugoslav state after that, it shares with Austria its Middle European 
heritage, while at the same time bearing the stamp of post World War 
II socialist development of a very specific kind. At the point of 
dismantling of socialism, the degree of congruence with East European 
post communist regimes hinges on the following features: dominance 
of political and not economic decision making in the economic sphere, 
absence of private ownership of capital, disregard for private sectors 
of the economy especially private agriculture, a soft budget constraint 
at the enterprize level, low levels of economic efficiency and labour 
productivity, no capital and bond markets. Features which made 
Croatia stand apart from the main body of iron curtain countries are: 
free movement of people and free inflow of capital across borders 
after 1965, high levels of autonomous decision making, including 
investment decisions by firms, some sectors of the economy were 
open to foreign competition, an export sector oriented to the foreign 
exchange markets. 
 
It follows from the above that, given the much more open nature of 
the economy, the transition to a market economy in Croatia should be 
less painful than in ex-iron curtain countries. There is, however, the 
disastrous effect of the Serb occupation of a part of Croatia which has 
disrupted the normal transition process and incurred tremendous 
additional costs both in material terms and in terms of human life. 
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Estimates indicate that war damages amount to US$ 20-30 billion, 
exceeding the country's annual GDP more than twice. There are, in 
addition, 500,000 refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia and 




The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the current problems 
faced by decision makers on the labour market in Croatia. The central 
dilemma focuses on devising the most efficient, timely and socially as 
well as financially acceptable transition to a fully fledged market 
economy. This task has potentially highest social costs on the labour 
market for the following reasons: privatization (which is seen as an 
essential stepping stone to a market economy) coupled with a pro-
employer oriented labour legislation will potentially replace a lot of 
present job holders; restructuring - a gargantuan task of reallocating 
productive resources, will render many skills redundant and a major 
reskilling of the labour force is in order. In this paper we propose to 
proceed with a snapshot of the Croatian labour market, with relevant 
reflections from the past which are important for understanding its 
present features. We shall point to some of the characteristics which 
will need to be changed in order to achieve some of the desirable 
qualities of an efficient labour market. Following that, we review some 
of the basic characteristics of the two antipodes, the Swedish and the 
US labour markets and reflect on the direction which the Croatian 
labour market development should take. 
 
A. The labour market: some facts and figures 
 
From a total population of 4,78 million in 1991, 67.5% is of working 
age (15-64 yrs.) Figure 1 shows some basic facts about the 
demographic framework of the Croatian labour market as well as 
employment and unemployment from 1981, 1991 to 1993. Both the 
total population and the working age population have a negative 
growth rate since 1991. 
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The activity rates have changed significantly since 1981, the major 
trend being in the reduction of the male activity rate from 77.4% in 
1981 to 75.5% in 1991 (censal years). The female activity rates, on 
the other hand, have risen from 52.0% of the 1981 working-age 
population, to 55.1 % in 1991. By definition, the employment and 
unemployment figures should, roughly, add up to the active 
population figure but in Croatia there is a difference between the two 
figures as can be seen by the widening gap between active population 
and the sum of the employed and the unemployed. It seems that this 
difference may be attributed to several factors. Firstly, the private 
sector is underepresented in official statistics. Employment in private 
agriculture is completely missing while being only partially present for 
other activities in the private sector. Most of the shadow economy 
employment takes place in the private sector, since labour costs are 
prohibitive for small scale employers and part of their workers are 
habitually not registered. This is the long term effect which contributes 




There is, however, the short term effect which has to do with the low 
level of labour demand, and, most recently, with the reduction in the 
social sector employment and the decrease in unemployment. This 
considerable difference is thus a relatively good indicator of 
unregistered employment. Official employment has been falling since 
1990, with a simultaneous rise in unemployment figures. Table 1 




Total population includes Croat citizens temporarily abroad. 
Activity rates are calculated as the total domestic civilian active population 
(censal data) divided by the total domestic population. 
Unemployment rates A - is the official unemployment rate calculated as the 
number of the unemployed over the sum of fhe employed and the unemployed as 
official statistics register. 8 - is the unemployment rate when employment in 
private agriculture is added in the denominator and C is the unemployment rate 
when the number of the "unemployed" among the employed is added to the 
official number of the unemployed. 
Employment ratio is the relation between the employed and the working age 
population. 
Demographic reserves represent the difference between the working age and 
the active populations. 
Labour hoarding. The extent of labour surplus among the employed was 
calculated basically by extrapolating the historically attained highest labour 
productivity to consecutive levels of production and comparing the number of 
workers which produced that output with the number of workers who could have 
produced the same output had the highest, historically attained level of labour 





The negative trend in employment is the most conspicuous segment 
of both Table 1 and Figure 1. The 1993 employment figure is only 
69% of the 1981 level. The greater part of this reduction can be 
attributed to the fall in social sector employment, although private 
sector employment was halved in terms of its 1981 level. Most of the 
fall in private sector employment is of the structural kind, due to the 
contraction of the agricultural sector. However, private sector 
employment in other activities has shown high growth rates and an 
extraordinary resilience in spite of the prolonged recession over the 
last decade. The share of this sector is, however, too small to make a 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed discussion on the methodology of estimating the extent of 
labour hoarding see Crnković-Pozaić S. et al: Tržište rada u Hrvatskoj (The Labour 
Market in Croatia), EIZ, Zagreb, 1994. 
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difference to the overall figure or to offset the fall in social sector 
employment. 
 
The reduction in social sector employment is the effect of legislation 
which allowed for lay-offs in bankrupt enterprises. There has been a 
slow down in closures of enterprises since then but it is unlikely that 
the entire surplus of workers among the employed has been 
eradicated. What seems to have happened is that the sudden surge of 
unemployment benefit claimants increased government transfers to 
such an extent that it proved more expensive to sustain them than to 
keep them underemployed in their places of work. 
 
Figure 2 shows the structure of employment by major sectors in 1981, 
1991 and 1993. The histograms clearly show the contraction of the 
employed labour force, as well as, its changing structure. The share of 
the primary sector has decreased from 24.1 % in 1981 to 12.9% in 
1993. The secondary sector has increased its share from 34.8% to 
45% in the same time period, while the tertiary sector, after an initial 
increase in its share, settled down to 42.1 % of total employment. 
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If we look at the change in the employment ratio which shows the 
share of the employed in the working age population we can see that 
it fell from 59.4% to 41.8% in 1993 which is a very low level. At the 
present level of GDP per capita it is very unlikely that a society could 
survive with such a small share of the employed in the working age 
population. In fact, official employment statistics are becoming a poor 
indicator of true employment levels as an increasing share or 
economic activity becomes untransparent in the shadow economy. 
 
A.2. The Unemployed 
 
We have seen that unemployment, as it is officially measured, rose 
from 4.5% in 1981 to 15.7% of the labour force. These figures, 
however, cannot easily be compared to the unemployment figures 
which are based on ILO criteria for labour statistics. The true 
unemployment rate cannot be measured accurately on the basis of 
official statistics for several reasons: - not all categories of the 
employed are counted among the labour force (employment in private 
agriculture is missing altogether although it is still about 200,000 
persons and the employment in other private sector activities is 
understated); - the unemployed often do not measure up to the three 
criteria for determination of the unemployment status, i.e. that a 
person is unemployed in the reference period, that he/she is actively 
looking for work and is presently available for work. Many of our 
unemployed are in fact working, since there is only a 10% (1994) 
coverage of the unemployed by the unemployment benefits (up from 
a 4.5% share in 1981). The benefits themselves are inadequate to 
cover even the most basic needs. There is wider coverage by health 
insurance which is the strongest motive for registering at the 
Employment Office. In 1981, 39.3% of the unemployed had health 
insurance while in 1994, their share rose to 63.7%. Furthermore, 
some of the unemployed are not prepared to take up a job offer, since 
the level of pay may be too low or the job may be unacceptably far 
away. The unemployed are allowed to refuse employment, but only a 
relatively small number do so. However, there is a regular 
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phenomenon of the unemployed leaving the unemployment status on 
a relatively large scale as can be seen on Figure 3. The outflow from 
the unemployment status is shown desegregated into two 
components. Some of the leavers find employment, mainly through 
efforts of the Employment Office, while others simply leave the 
register. There is no evidence as to whether these persons enter 
unregistered employment or leave the labour force all together. It 
seems that the unemployed simply fail to appear at the Employment 
Office at the obligatory intervals and they are taken off the register. 
Up to 1987, a greater share of the leavers found jobs, but thereafter, 
a greater share left the register with destination unknown. There are 
indications that these persons left the register at the point when they 
lost unemployment benefit or health insurance rights. 
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Roughly up to 1989, the inflow and the outflow from unemployment 
was equal; from 1989 to 1992,the inflow rate was higher than the 
outflow and thereafter the outflow exceeded the inflow, reducing total 
unemployment figures. It is precisely at this time that the share of 
those who left the register increased in relation to all leavers, which 
seems to indicate that the unemployed have given up the attempt to 
solve their employment problem through the official channels. 
 
Figure 4. presents the qualification structure of the unemployed in 
March 1994. The majority of the unemployed are women (55.2%), but 
the highest percentage of the unemployed are skilled and highly 
skilled workers. They are followed by secondary school or technical 
(vocational) school leavers (23.1 %) and the unskilled workers 
(21.6%). Women dominate in all skill categories except the 
skilled/highly skilled, which happens to have the greatest share. Only 
7.9% of the unemployed have a college or university education and 
almost two-thirds of this category are women. 
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If we take a look at the number of those who are seeking work for the 
first time in their working lives, their share fell from 49.3% of the 
average yearly unemployment to 32% in 1994. Before the introduction 
of more flexible labour legislation, when lay-offs were practically non-
existent, unemployment was mostly youth unemployment. This 
category was demographically determined to a large extent by the size 
of the yearly inflow into the working age population times the activity 
rate of the youngest active age group. Since there were no lay-offs, 
youth employment depended on the outflow rate from the labour 
force and the creation of new jobs which was very low over the last 
decade. However, the relative share of youth unemployment in total 
employment dropped as the level of unemployment rose due to large 
scale redundancies, increasing the heretofore low share of other age-
specific unemployment categories. 
 
A.3. Labour Hoarding, Vacancies, Unemployment Rates 
 
Table 1 offers three types of unemployment rates which display a 
wide range of figures from 4.5% to 13.3% in 1981 and 16.5% to 
38.2% of the labour force in 1993. As mentioned before, the 
unemployment rates under A are calculated as the officially registered 
unemployment divided by the sum of officially registered employment 
and unemployment. These figures are higher than those under B 
because the number of unregistered unemployment in private 
agriculture has been added to the denominator. This indicator is 
somewhat undependable since no data are available on the number of 
the unemployed in private agriculture. The third measure adds the 
estimated number of excess workers among the employed to the 
official numbers of the unemployed. The result is an incredibly high 
figure of 38% of the labour force in 1993. The merits of this measure 
can be debated but it does give some indication of what the 
restructuring of the economy will mean for the labour market. It is out 
of the question to allow all the surplus workers to be laid-off, since 
that would bring the number of unemployed to 1 /2 a million people or 
18% of the working age population. As it stands, the demographic 
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reserves have increased by 19.9% from 1991 to 1993, indicating that 
the discouraged worker effect or demand deficient unemployment is 
indeed enormous. 
 
When we look at what is happening to labour demand there is not 
much room for optimism. A meager 16,624 vacancies were registered 
in 1981, which was only 19.3% of the unemployed. In 1993, that 
percentage was down to 4.5%. 
 
B. The demographic framework 
 
The demographic features of Croatia's population place it neatly into 
the general European demographic framework. Since 1991, the 
natural increase of the population is negative - -1.0%, with 9.8 live 
births and 10.8 deaths per thousand inhabitants. Low fertility is the 
outcome of two tendencies. On the one hand, the age structure of the 
childbearing female population is affected by decreasing shares of 
females in the 20-34 age group which has the greatest reproductive 
potential (85.4% of all children are born to women of this age group). 
The rate of gross reproduction of the female population is below one 
and the average number of children born is 1.92 per woman. Were 
simple reproduction of the population to be achieved, every woman 
should, on average, have 2.15 children. There have been some 
positive effects on fertility due to an increase in the number of women 
in the 15-55 age group but this has been inadequate to offset the 
negative basic demographic trends. 
 
The demographic factors have a direct bearing on the population of 
working age which can be seen in Figure 5 where the interplay of the 
inflow and the outflow from working age is shown. The figures 
projected from 1990 did not take into account the considerable loss of 
life and displacement of able bodied persons in the war so that the 
actual picture, as far as the replacement of the working age 
population is concerned, is worse than portrayed in the picture. 
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The share of the active in the working age population is 64.8% with 
relatively little variation in time but very dynamic structural change in 
the male and female activity rates. The decline in male activity rates in 
all age groups is just about offset by the increase in female activity 
rates. Both sexes share a decline in activity rates of the very young 
and the old active persons which is a feature common to most 
European countries. Most of the activity rate dynamics are due to 
changes in work behavioural patterns of males and females while the 




The mechanical component of population dynamics in Croatia is quite 
important in its own right. There is a traditional out-migration of 
labour from Croatia since before the turn of the century motivated 
mainly by bleak economic prospects in the country at various times. 
Destinations are mostly Western Europe, the Americas and Australia. 
According to the 1991 Census, there were 175,338 Croatian workers 
abroad, 53% thereof in Germany, and a further 22% in the rest of 
Europe. However, since the oil crisis in 1973, the ratio of emigrants to 
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returnees is less than one but not all of them consequently appear on 
the labour market. 
 
Thus, as far as demographic determinants of the labour market 
framework are concerned the following factors stand out. 
1. Due to the decrease in the natural increase of the population, 
as well as emigration flows, the replacement of the working 
age population will, in absence of immigration flows, be a 
long-term constraint on labour supply development. However, 
the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons presently 
residing in Croatia from Bosnia and Hercegovina may show a 
reluctance to return to their destroyed homes and will remain 
a part of our labour force. There are also ample demographic 
reserves in the short and medium term as well as high levels 
of unemployment. 
2. Activity rates of males have decreased in all age groups and 
especially in the 15-24 and the 55 and over age groups. While 
female activity rates are also falling in these age groups, on 
the whole there has been a substantial rise in aggregate and 
prime age female activity rates. These tendencies are 
expected to continue albeit at a slower pace in the long term 
but the greatest changes will take place in the short term 
adjustment of labour force size in response to cyclical 
fluctuations. 
 
C. Interplay of labour demand and supply 
 
The Croatian labour market can be said to be in permanent 
disequilibrium with varying quantities of excess labour. The large scale 
restructuring from a predominantly agrarian to an industrial economy 
is over and the changing structure of the active population which is 
showing considerable growth in the tertiary sector is a good indicator 
of the changing structure of the economy as a whole. The rate of job 
creation in the modern sector has, by and large, proved inadequate to 
absorb the spontaneous move out of agriculture, but the only gauge 
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of the extent of the change was the growth of social sector 
employment and the growing number of emigrant workers. The 
unemployment figures simply did not register labour force surplus due 
to inadequate motivation for the unemployed to register.2 
 
It is important to realize what the official unemployment figures 
actually convey. In the past, unemployment rates were positively 
related to employment rates. Katz,3 has called this "growth-induced 
unemployment" which fits quite well into the Harris-Todaro model of 
the labour market in Third World countries. Under conditions of 
permanent job scarcity, in periods of fast growth, job creation is 
dynamic and employment swells. Since high growth rates speed up 
restructuring of the economy there are large scale movements of the 
active population from more passive to more propulsive sectors and 
their pressure raises both the employment and the unemployment 
figures. The opposite happens when the economy slows down and job 
prospects are low. Some of the surplus labour remains employed but 
pertorms at low levels of labour productivity or is simply idle, while 
unemployment stagnates or even falls as the lack of job opportunities 
reduces the prospects of getting a job through the Employment 
Offices. The category of discouraged workers swells outside the 
officially monitored labour force. Now, when a wave of redundancies 
                                                          
2 Among the possible motives for registering at an Employment Office, the most 
important was health insurance. About 60-70% of the unemployed were covered 
by this form of social security while only 15% received unemployment benefits. 
However, the replacement ratio is about 30% and it is reasonable to suppose that 
unemployed males of working age had to supplement their income in some way. 
Some of the unemployed who have no other sources of income are also legible for 
social security payments. However, a large share of the unemployed attempt to 
supplement their income by working in the shadow economy and, as such, do not 
satisfy one of the three ILO recommendations for classification of the 
unemployed. On the other hand, part of the unemployed really have no intention 
of taking a job. This would indicate that unemployment figures are inflated but 
there are also indications that the number of discouraged workers who are not in 
the labour force and potentially unemployed could easily outrun the number of the 
quasi unemployed. 
 
3 See Katz, Arnold:1985. 
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appeared in 1990, all of them registered as unemployed as they could 
claim both unemployment benefits and health insurance for a time. As 
soon as the rate of increase of redundancies fell and the 
unemployment benefit receipt period ran out, unemployment and 
employment both started to fall. Thus, very unfavourable conditions 
on the labour market have created a situation where the labour force 
is apparently contracting, but both the employed and the unemployed 
alike are working in the shadow economy in order to survive. The 
existent methods of data collection are inadequate and the relevant 
institutions should organize labour force surveys based on households 
which would catch most of the unrecorded economic activity of the 
working age population. It is very important also to express the work 
effort in terms of hours of work and not individual workers since 
persons often hold several jobs and work longer than usual working 
hours. 
 
D. The institutional features of the labour market 
 
According to the latest version of the Labour Law a tripartite 
arrangement of the various groups on and around the labour market 
is envisaged. On the one hand, there are the representative 
organizations of workers, the trade unions, which can be organized 
according to occupations or sectors or both, with the type of hierarchy 
of their own choosing. On the other hand, there are the various 
organizations of employers and finally the government itself through 
its Ministry of Labour. The Central Employment Office with its network 
of regional supportive offices is a part of the Ministry of Labour. There 
is a Central office in Zagreb, 18 regional offices and 88 branches. 
Regional offices are present in all administrative regions and 
organizationally the network seems to be adequate for the type of 
activity which is presently carried out by the Employment Office. Its 
functions are: information dissemination, collection and processing of 
statistics, carrying out measures of active labour market policy which 
includes professional orientation, financing of retraining, 
supplementing labour costs for target categories of workers, 
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unemployment benefit payments and minimal wage payments to 
those workers whose income is below that level. 
 
There is also a standing Committee for Social and Economic Disputes 
(Gospodarsko-socijalno vijeće) whose prime purpose is arbitration 
between representatives of employers and employees and 
government in conflicts. Its' other duties are to monitor labour market 
developments both in the legislative and economic policy segments. 
 
D.1. The Legislature 
 
The parliament has, on more than one occasion, declined to pass the 
draft of the Labour Law and demanded its revision. At this moment we 
can lay out the pros and the cons of the final version of the Labour 
Law as it will appear at one of the coming parliamentary debates. As it 
stands, it is an unnecessarily large document containing 242 articles. 
 
The logic behind changing the existing work legislature is the belief 
that the laws inherited from the socialist system are not appropriate in 
a market economy, that they give the worker a degree of job security 
which interferes with the right of employers to vary their labour force 
according to economic circumstances. Labour rights are seen to be at 
odds with a flexible labour market in which the employer must be able 
to manage his labour resources in line with economic criteria. There is 
also the intention of making labour regulation similar to that in other 
Western European countries so that future investors find similar forms 
of labour organizations in Croatia as in their own countries. The 
present draft of the Labour Law is the brain-child of lawyers who 
made a concoction of West European legislature, leaning most heavily 
on German Labour Law. The draft has received approval from ILO 
staff who gave several suggestions which were later included in the 
draft of the Law. It can, therefore, safely be maintained that most of 
the civilizational achievements in the field of labour relations in Europe 
are represented in the Law. It is another matter whether the Law 
takes into account the specific labour market situation in this country 
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and the challenges of economic restructuring which lie ahead. At this 
point in time, trade unions are only beginning to test their strength 
against employers, the government and other entities in their field of 
interest. It is quite appropriate to ask how legitimate the trade unions 
are among the workers as well as how they can and will use their 
potential power. These are political considerations and their course is 
still a matter of speculation, but the Labour Law has given the trade 
unions the place which they have in more developed countries as an 
equal partner in labour negotiations at every level. In this sense, the 
Law is somewhat ahead of happenings and the government is creating 
its own partner in negotiations giving him perhaps the legitimacy it 
has yet to prove to its electoral base. 
 
Another feature of the labour market in Croatia also tests the 
adequacy of the legislature. Namely, most trade unions seek to 
organize workers in the state owned sector so that any tripartite 
negotiations will end up with a two to one vote for the government 
which is still the biggest employer. In perspective, as the private 
sector increases its relative share either through privatization or 
autonomous growth, this problem will recede as trade unions come to 
represent individual employers. 
 
The existence of a large shadow economy also tests the relevance of 
the technically well defined Labour Law. We have seen above that the 
chronic dearth of jobs in the formal sector caused a decrease in the 
officially registered labour force, simultaneously swelling employment 
in the shadow economy. The Labour Law relates only to the formal 
sector and the workers rights and obligations which it determines can 
be enjoyed only by the formally employed. In this sense, the Law 
deepens the existing segmentation of the labour market making some 
jobs more secure, providing a whole series of services to workers in 
the formal sector which are non-existent in the shadow economy. The 
question arises who benefits from the Law and who remains outside 
it? The workers in the shadow economy have no security, no 
redundancy payments, no social security and health insurance 
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arrangements, no training possibilities, no maternity leave and no 
unemployment benefits. The workers in the social/state sectors, 
regardless of their decreasing numbers, continue to enjoy a similar 
level of security and other rights which they had in the socialist system 
and yet it is precisely this sector of the economy which is expected to 
undergo the greatest changes in terms of labour force retraining and 
production restructuring. If a rigid legislature is superimposed on this 
sector of employment it will make the transition process even more 
difficult if trade unions pursue the path of conflict rather than 
cooperation. This is not to say that all of the employees organizations 
and the legislature which regulate their activity should be suspended. 
They should instead be defined in such a way as to be able to fulfill 
the restructuring tasks which lie ahead more efficiently. 
 
E. Major impediments to creating an efficient  
    labour market 
 
In view of the above, we can deduce which of the features of the 
Croatian labour market are a major impediment to developing an 
efficient labour market. Efficiency in the labour market can be defined 
as the ability to adapt to long and short term changes in demand. By 
long term changes we mean structural adjustment whereby whole 
sectors of the economy gain and loose importance in line with long 
term changes in the content of demand for commodities. On the other 
hand, cyclical fluctuations are caused by short term changes in 
demand. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish between the two types 
of change in real life, but the type of adjustment which needs to be 
made requires action on several different levels. Firstly, the macro 
aspects of flexibility. They include institutional arrangements, the 
legislature, and labour market policy. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly is flexibility at the intra enterprize micro levels. Still, the 
most serious impediment to creating an efficient labour market is the 
present recession itself. The work force is immobilized in their present 
places of work since labour demand is very low. There is almost no 
job mobility, little retraining, and the level of average wages is so low 
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that sometimes two earners in a household cannot support a family of 
four. Until this trend is reversed, no measures of creating a more 
efficient labour market can be expected to meet with any success. 
 
E.1. Macro Impediments to Labour Market Efficiency 
 
The Employment Office is, at present, adequately equipped for 
carrying out data collection, processing and dissemination and it 
serves this purpose well. The other functions, however, such as 
analysis of unemployment trends and the formulation of labour market 
policies are not satisfactory due to a lack of adequately trained 
personnel both for setting the strategy and implementing it. What is 
sorely needed is more expertise "at the top" in order for a clear 
formulation of the concept of labour market regulation to crystalize. At 
the moment, employment and unemployment are looked at as almost 
separate phenomena and the concept of labour market as a single 
economic entity with its actors, behaviour and environment is still not 
clear to many decision makers. However, even when this hurdle is 
circumvented there is still the need to introduce labour force surveys 
in order to be able to analyze true trends on the labour market. 
Thereafter, labour market research should receive adequate funds to 
make up for lost time as far as labour economics research activities 
are concerned. 
 
The labour market regulating legislature, regardless of content, is also 
an impediment to labour market restructuring in that the process of 
political negotiation surrounding it is time consuming. The trade 
unions, who are not satisfied with the level of worker protection in the 
Labour Law as well as other political forces are preventing the Law 
from being passed in parliament. It is, of course, of considerable 
importance for an all around acceptable final draft to surface in order 
to minimize future conflict from the start. However, the Law is a 
battering ram used for the various political actors to test their strength 
and it may be some time before the consensus is decided on. 
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Thirdly, although there are provisions in the Labour Law on the active 
role of employers in reallocating and retraining superfluous workers, 
support mechanisms on the part of the government as well as trade 
unions are not adequate. There is a trade-off between the level of 
worker protection and the level of government involvement in the 
labour market. If there is high worker protection as well as wage 
rigidity, such as most workers in Sweden enjoy, then the achievement 
of flexibility in the most general sense, depends on the ability of 
relevant factors to replace the market mechanism. We shall see later 
how this works in practice. 
 
Fourthly, the cost of labour is prohibitive. The difference between the 
gross and the net wage is 120%, i.e. in order to pay a wage of 100, 
the cost to the employer is 220. All workers still enjoy complete health 
insurance as well and make regular payments towards the state 
pension fund and other forms of solidarity (for the unemployed, child 
benefits for the needy, as well as local taxes which vary from region to 
region). But that is still not the entire labour cost to the employer. 
There are many non-wage benefits from employment which range 
from travel expenses, food coupons to cheaper holiday arrangements, 
etc. The prohibitive cost of labour has a decisive negative effect both 
on employment creation and it impairs the ability of the employer to 
stimulate the already employed worker more efficiently. For each dinar 
of efficiency wages the employer might want to pay he has to add 1.2 
dinars for benefit payments which he rarely wants to do. In the 
private sector most firms have a steady, registered part of their labour 
force and its unregistered workers who have agreed to wave their 
health insurance and pension payments in return for a higher net 
wage. The effects are bad for the worker who can be exploited in 
conditions of labour surplus (he cannot insure himself as there are no 
non-state health insurance firms or pension schemes), worse for the 
state, which doesn't get its cut and bad for the employer who is forced 
to brake the law for the most routine activities. What is more, 
unemployed workers who have to become employed in the private 
sector where there is no trade union activity and no legal protection, 
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they face intense competition from employed persons. Since these 
underemployed persons enjoy all benefits from their primary 
employment, private employers prefer to employ them to the truly 
unemployed so as to transfer some of the labour cost on the primary 
employer who is usually in the state/social sectors. 
 
The relatively low level of demand for labour restricts labour mobility. 
Present jobs are filled because no other are available regardless of 
how disagreeable or unsatisfactory they may be. Labour mobility is 
also curtailed through firm specific housing or credit arrangements 
which are not transferable and can only be enjoyed if employment is 
maintained. Since these non-wage benefits are very important not 
only for individuals but their families as well, mobility is discouraged. 
On the other hand, regional labour mobility has, on the whole been 
quite dynamic, to the detriment of more equitable regional 
development. Some regions are facing dramatic demographic decline 
induced by excessive out-migration, while a handful of towns (Zagreb 
is way ahead in that respect) account for up to 60% of overall 
employment (depending on type of economic activity). 
 
E.2. Micro Impediments to Labour Market Efficiency 
 
The internal flexibility in enterprises is also rigid. It is still considered 
unacceptable to allocate new jobs to employees within the firm and 
there is a lot of resistance to such moves by the management. The 
main agenda for the management is short-term survival and long term 
manpower development plans are rare. Formal qualifications are 
considered the prime allocator or manpower in the firm and wage 
formation is also largely qualification dependant. No efforts are made 
to match individual abilities with specific job requirements at the firm 
level. Individuals are stuck with their jobs for life although there is 
ample opportunity for managers to assess individual capabilities and 
match them with suitable jobs. 
There is also limited vertical mobility in firms. Intra firm labour 
relations are size dependant. Large firms have very hierarchical 
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management systems while small firms do not. Nevertheless, there is 
usually an unproductive lack of communication and distrust between 
workers and management. Managers are seen as individuals with no 
scruples whose prime aim is self-enrichment and attainment of 
privileges. Workers feel exploited and underpaid and their work ethic 
is low. The work effort is dependent on individual sense of obligation 
and motivation. This is the dominant situation in the social/state 
sector. In the private sector the role of manager is very much closer 
to the Western blueprint. 
 
F. Which role model for Croatia: Sweden or the USA? 
 
The main feature of the US labour market is its ability to create jobs. 
From 1982, 18 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate 
was reduced from 10.6% to 5.3% in 1989. Most of the new jobs (88.1 
%) opened in firms of up to 20 workers and there was substantial 
growth of self-employment. This success has mainly been attributed to 
both upward and downward flexibility of wages, a flexible labour 
legislature which does not regulate either hiring nor firing and no 
general coverage of workers by health insurance or old-age provisions. 
The US labour market, especially after the deregulation of the Reagan 
era became less succeptable to the usual trade union pressures4 which 
are taken for granted in the European setting. The supply side 
orthodoxy has many supporters in the US. The usual contentions 
apply, namely, that high and inflexible real wages have been one of 
the principal causes of high and persistent unemployment in Western 
Europe; that centralized collective bargaining has contributed to that 
pattern so that a decentralization would ensure not only overall wage 
flexibility but greater allocative efficiency in the labour market; and 
finally, that reduced wage differentials have strongly contributed to 
the  unemployment  of  particular  groups,  notably  youths,  and have   
                                                          
4 The unsuccessful strike by Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization 
(PATCO) considerably slacked union perspectives for leverage in labour market 
negotiations. 
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severely impeded labour mobility. The prescription of the supply side 
economic orthodoxy is that to reduce unemployment, wages should be 
allowed to fall, wage differentials increased and wage bargaining 
decentralized. There are, however, much criticized attempts by the 
present administration to bring some of the fruits of the European 
labour relations heritage to the working American. President Clinton 
extended unemployment benefits as well as the duration of 
unemployment benefits by twenty weeks in states with low 
unemployment rates and twenty-six weeks in states with high rates. 
There is also the Americans with Disabilities Act which prevents 
discrimination by employers of workers with disabilities (persons with 
a history of drug or alcohol abuse and AIDS victims fall into this 
category), the Family and Medical Leave Act which allows for unpaid 
leave for workers with protracted family problems, and finally the 
Plant Closures Act from 1988, whereby advance notice of any closure 
or layoff involving fifty or more full-time workers has to be given. 
Orthodox economics will argue that all these pieces of legislature will 
restrict job-creation and bring the US nearer to its own version of 
Eurosclerosis. In Sweden, the whole way of looking at the problem of 
labour market functioning is seen from an entirely different angle. 
 
Table 2 shows some comparative labour market data for Sweden and 
the USA from 1983-1992. The unemployment rates have the same 
trend but the Swedish figures are on a much lower general level. The 
employment creation dynamics have greater amplitudes in the USA 
than in Sweden and the general conclusion is that the Swedish labour 
market has much less fluctuation then the American. Some of the 
difference in the unemployment rates is due to the Swedish practice of 
not counting the workers undergoing training or other forms of 
education as being unemployed. These statistical effects have been 
pointed to in the literature as the being the entire substance of the 
low Swedish unemployment rates. Although there is some truth in 
this, the argument has to be placed in the right framework, i.e. if large 
numbers of the unemployed are in one way or another taken out of 
unemployment and given the opportunity to reenter the labour force 
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with new marketable skills and eventually find employment, that is not 
a much better solution than to have the unemployed fend for 
themselves. Their skill, self-esteem, and the material position of their 
dependants are deteriorating while job search is going on and the 
time spend in search which could be used to improve those skills 
which seem to have become less marketable, is lost. Obviously, there 
is something radically different in the Swedish model. 
 
 
Some of the interesting features of the Swedish experiment are a 
direct challenge to the neoclassical postulates. The aim of Swedish 
economists who laid the foundations of the Swedish model was the 
following: to achieve and maintain a maximum 2% unemployment 
rate by stimulating private investment, while regulating private 
enterprise; to "socialize" consumption through the development of an 
extensive Welfare state; to involve the government in the production 
process primarily through an active labour market policy which would 
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be designed to operate on the supply side of the labour market by 
improving labour mobility, reducing skill "bottle-necks" through labour 
market training, mopping up surplus labour through public relief jobs 
and providing work incentives through the democratization of working 
life. This aim was formulated on the basis of a negative evaluation of 
the Keynesian approach to full employment, which was that the 
expansionary and fiscal policies to boost aggregate demand, would 
create unmanageable inflationary pressures. This would occur partly 
because there would be no check on nominal wage rises and partly 
because in stimulating demand during a mild recession, the short-term 
mobility of labour and capital would be limited leading to inflationary 
excess demand for factors of production in some sectors and areas of 
the economy. 
 
The second principle was that active labour market policy should 
complement the restrictive demand policy to obtain full employment, 
absorb labour slack and promote structural adjustment through 
selective measures designed to secure labour mobility, overcome 
labour bottle-necks and to get the unemployed into temporary jobs or 
enable them to be hired by means of employment subsidies in 
recessions. 
 
The third principle is a solidaristic wage policy and the objective of 
gradually achieving equal pay for equal work based on centralized 
collective bargaining between the employer and union confederations, 
the SAF and LO. 
 
The fourth principle of the Swedish model was that of welfare 
capitalism. Social democracy implied the pursuit of equality and a 
steadily growing provision of social services which, in turn, implied a 
large and growing public sector, coupled with progressive taxation. 
The assumption was that socialism could be achieved by a strong 
socialist state based on an efficient capitalist base i.e. firms are 
efficient but the market system is not. 
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F.1. Lessons for Croatia 
 
Experiences of other countries usually cannot easily be copied. Nor 
should they be, since a different setting may produce unexpected 
responses to what seems to be the cure. For a country in transition, 
the basic dilemma can be reduced to the following. In order to 
develop a self-sustaining private enterprize sector, a new class of 
entrepreneur and pave the way to a wider privatization process it is 
necessary to create a competitive climate with simple and equal rules 
for all the actors. A lack of competition is the crux of the socialist 
heritage and it is the precondition for economic success in the future. 
On the other hand, to allow market elements to dictate the pace of 
the restructuring process, the human as well as overall economic cost 
would be too great. Therefore, it would seem that some intelligent 
combination of the two approaches has to be chosen. Since there are 
no well developed employers and employees associations with any 
experience of useful negotiation and bargaining, the State will have to 
play a mora active role than it did in Sweden. Its main aim should be 
to give opportunities for the two interest groups on the labour market 
to come together around subjects of interest. The new Labour 
legislature was a good opportunity for that but the government seems 
to be more on a collision course with the trade unions then trying to 
create a framework for fruitful cooperation. 
 
In the first stages of restructuring, the main approach should be to 
allow for competition in all the markets except the labour market. The 
scope of change is so great in this segment that a great national effort 
needs to be made to change the present economic structure of the 
working population. It is neither economically or politically feasible to 
allow large scale redundancies to occur, incurring even greater rates 
of unemployment than at present. Firstly, the state is too poor to offer 
an adequate safety net for the unemployed. Secondly, no new jobs 
are being created and the long duration of unemployment will deplete 
existing skill levels and on-the-job-training capabilities of workers. 
Thirdly, restructuring also means the acquisition of new skills to cope 
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with new production and organizational techniques, new technologies 
and work environments. The burden of this element of restructuring 
must be borne by all three parties: the employer, the State and the 
employee. The State needs to tailor its institutions and legislature in 
such a way as to give maximum support to employers and the 
employees in their search for "the right man for the right job". 
Matching has been exceptionally poor in ex-socialist countries and 
achieving labour mobility without the risk of redundancy would itself 
enhance labour productivity considerably. 
 
The Labour Law has made certain provisions which have to be 
honoured if the employer wants to lay-off more than 10% of his 
workers (in firms numbering more than 20 workers). Before laying 
them off he needs to submit a plan to the Employment office for 
either employing them on other jobs in the firm, retraining them or 
employing them with other employers. These plans also have to be 
discussed with "workers councils."5 There are also provisions for 
redundancy payments to be paid to all workers with more than two 
years of employment with the firm which amount to at least a half of 
the average pay over the three months prior to the lay-off for each 
year of employment. The lay-off plan has to be approved by the 
Employment Office before it can be put into effect. Although these 
provisions seem to give ample scope for an efficient solution to 
problems of labour transfer, in practice they will only act as brakes on 
lay-offs and not an adequate process of labour restructuring. The 
commitment to changing the structure of the labour force should be a 
conscious undertaking in which surplus workers should actively be 
helped by the previous employers and the state to develop new 
marketable skills and consequently new employment. The 
Employment Office should set up training centers for the attainment of 
skills for which there is demand. Employers should prepare plans for 
                                                          
5 The role of workers councils as they existed in the socialist era has changed 
considerably. They have lost most of their managerial role and are now mostly 
just representatives of employees who mediate on their behalf with the 
management. 
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retraining of their work forces and receive co-financing of training 
programs by the state. This sort of approach should also receive 
support from the trade unions who should, together with workers 
councils and employers, participate in the drawing up of employment 
plans. In this way cooperation can take the place of conflict to the 
benefit of all parties. This approach places stress on internal 
adjustment and pre-lay-off activity and retraining so it is not a 
preventive set of measures which either prevent lay-offs (in case the 
workers are retained) or prepare workers for new jobs elsewhere. The 
state of redundancy and long term unemployment is a wasteful and 
costly way of "managing" human resources especially in counties such 
as Croatia which face a long term demographic constraint in labour 
supply. Such employment plans have already been drawn up in 
Germany and France6 and they should receive due attention in 
Croatia. 
 
In summary, when considering the pros and cons of the US and the 
Swedish approaches to solving labour market problems, Croatia should 
lean more heavily on the Swedish experience including new types of 
structural adjustment experiences in other European countries. The 
trend seems to be towards more control of and active participation in 
labour market functioning and away from laissez faire random walk 
inherent in the market mechanism. 
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